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
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PERSIAN GULF: Iranian troops occupy disputed islands. (Page 9)



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INDIA-PAKISTAN: Mrs. Gandhi's tough statements before the upper house of the Indian parliament yesterday, in which she termed the presence of West Pakistani troops in East Pakistan a "threat" to India's security, appear to be further escalation in Indian efforts to pressure Islamabad into either accepting a political settlement of the crisis or initiating hostilities with its more powerful neighbor. Her warning that India would not stand by while Bengalis of East Pakistan were "annihilated" may be an attempt to justify a more active role in the future for the Indian armed forces in support of the guerrilla offensive in East Pakistan.

Mrs. Gandhi's latest statements coincide with reports of increasing pessimism among both Indian and Pakistani officials on the chances for peace. The Pakistani high commissioner in New Delhi is described by the US ambassador as "resigned" to the likelihood of war. The Indian ambassador to Afghanistan yesterday told US Embassy officers in Kabul that he anticipated hostilities within one week. Meanwhile, 90--virtually all--dependents of Indian officials in Karachi have left by air for New Delhi since last Sunday.

The situation along the East Pakistan border has not changed significantly. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] clashes continue near Jessore, and New Delhi admits that Indian troops are still involved in the fighting inside East Pakistan near Hilli. To the north, a battle appears to be continuing near Pachagarh--which the Pakistani Army has abandoned under pressure--and other clashes reportedly are occurring in the area near Kamalpur in Mymensingh District, inside the northern border of Sylhet District, and along the western border of East Pakistan in the Belonia salient. The border between Indian and West Pakistan remains generally quiet.

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Meanwhile, the Bangla Desh radio recently broadcast the longest and most vitriolic attack on the US Government in some time. Washington was charged with, among other accusations, attempting to destroy the unity between the Bangla Desh regime and the guerrilla forces, and seeking to "internationalize" the West Pakistan - East Pakistan crisis as a means of giving President Yahya Khan a chance to regain his dwindling strength. The radio attacks conceivably could lead to guerrilla action against US personnel or facilities in East Pakistan although, as in the past, the broadcast tended to differentiate between the government and people of the US.

Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on Monday voiced Peking's strongest and most authoritative accusation against India in the current phase of the crisis, but again made evident China's desire for a political settlement. Li accused India of carrying out subversive activities and military provocations as well as invading and occupying Pakistani territory. Li lashed out at the USSR indirectly, accusing it of supporting and encouraging the Indians, but his criticisms did not match those delivered last Friday at the UN by Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, who called the Indo-Soviet treaty signed last August essentially a military

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[alliance, adding that it had led to "bare-faced aggression against Pakistan." Li's speech and Chiao's harsh words mark a step up in Peking's public expressions of concern but evidence no change in China's basic policy of maintaining cautious political and military assistance to the Pakistan Government, while urging it to work as rapidly as possible toward a political settlement within East Pakistan and with India.


In New York, the president of the Security Council has circulated to Council members a letter from Yahya to Secretary General Thant requesting that UN observers be sent to the Pakistani side of the East Pakistan borders. Thant had sent the request to the president of the Council with the notation that the matter was beyond his competence and should come before the Security Council under the terms of the UN charter. Thant's conception of a limited mandate for himself and the need for a formal decision by the Security Council in order to dispatch UN observers probably kills any immediate prospect that observers will be sent. Yahya's request will probably remain in limbo unless some member formally requests a Council meeting to deal with the question. The Pakistani ambassador at the UN has stated that he will not request a meeting of the Security Council in the absence of specific instructions to do so from Islamabad.

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CAMBODIA: Route 6 Area



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CAMBODIA: The Communists apparently are resuming the offensive against the Chenla II forces.

25X1 [redacted] the Communists have surrounded some government units near the town of Kompong Thmar, the logistics base for the Chenla II-North force. The Communists have captured a portion of Route 6 south of the town, thus isolating the government base at Baray where heavy fighting also appears to have broken out. US aerial observers have reported that there is fighting along Route 21 southeast of Kompong Thmar and that elements of one government battalion have abandoned weapons, ammunition, and vehicles while retreating from enemy attacks.

In resuming the offensive, the Communists may be trying to take advantage of the diversion of almost 20 battalions of government troops, including several elite Khmer Krom units, to the defense of Phnom Penh. There still are about 22,000 government troops in the Chenla II force, but the northern elements are cut off and are dependent on aerial resupply. The government had hoped to build a series of strongpoints along the road, but it probably will be unable to defend such isolated positions if the Communists keep up the pressure.

Fighting in the Kompong Thmar area suggests that the Communists will not soon be diverted from the Route 6 area by the South Vietnamese offensive east of the Mekong. If the Communists continue to attack the Chenla II force, Phnom Penh will probably ask Saigon to send troops west of the Mekong as the South Vietnamese did last year at this time.

[redacted]

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SOUTH VIETNAM: The Viet Cong appear to be putting greater emphasis on getting more of their cadre under cover to subvert the legal political structure.

The Communist high command in South Vietnam called for stepped-up covert operations last spring,

Since then, the evidence has tended to confirm that the enemy is making more use of undercover agents. During the recent elections in South Vietnam, there were numerous reports of attempts by Viet Cong agents to woo support away from government candidates for the Lower House and to encourage a boycott of the presidential referendum.

the enemy is still trying to recruit new people and to keep them in place while they are trained as enemy agents.

Large numbers of such "legal cadre" reportedly have been acquiring government identification papers by bribing officials. Once established, the cadre usually try to proselyte other citizens in order to penetrate and subvert government security and military units, political parties, and other government-authorized organizations.

Such operations are a means of circumventing the government's improved security apparatus in the countryside. While legal cadre might be used to support future enemy military operations, the Communists apparently are also preparing for the post-hostilities period when legal cadre in positions of influence could help them manipulate the postwar administration. Thus far, enemy penetrations in the government and military establishments seem to be confined largely to lower levels.


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
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Persian Gulf Islands Occupied by Iranian Troops

Great Tunb

(Claimed by Ras al Khaimah - Controlled by Iran)



Little Tunb

(Claimed by Ras al Khaimah - Controlled by Iran)




- Village
- ⚓ Anchorage
- ⚓ Navigation beacon
- ✕ Extractive activity

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MILES
Same scale for all islands.

Abu Musa

(Jointly controlled by Sharjah and Iran)



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PERSIAN GULF: Iranian troops have occupied the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, climaxing years of dispute and months of negotiations with the sheikdoms of Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah.

Iran claims Ras al Khaimah had not informed the Great Tunb Police Force about the impending occupation, and the police opened fire, killing three Iranians. Four local police were killed in the action. Ras al Khaimah maintains the island was shelled before the invasion, destroying its military post.

Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda has told parliament that Iran will never relinquish sovereignty over Abu Musa and "the presence of other elements on the island does not affect this position." The Iranians probably see the joint occupation of Abu Musa as a temporary arrangement and can be expected to press for total sovereignty.

【 Except for Iraq, which last night announced it was breaking relations with the UK and Iran, Arab reaction so far to the Iranian occupation of the islands has been limited. Iraq has made no distinction between the Abu Musa and Tunbs landings, describing the Iranian action as "a flagrant violation of Arab sovereignty" and "a serious threat to the security and safety of the area and international navigation." More hot words can be expected and Iraq and Yemen (Aden) may attempt to raise the issue in the UN, but most Arab states are preoccupied with more critical issues.]

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